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Agency, Stewardship and Corporate Acquisition Decisions 
 
We test whether companies with better ESG performance make poorer merger and acquisition 
deals because they may limit their choices for targets with similar ESG performance or need to 
invest more into improving targets’ ESG performance, compared to acquirers with poor ESG 
performance. We also test whether companies with better ESG performance are more likely to 
pay CEOs lower percentage of equity-based compensation, and are more likely to adopt CEO 
duality since CEOs tend to be driven by stewardship in companies with better ESG performance.  
We find that acquiring companies with above-average ESG performance underperform those with 
below-average ESG performance and the finding is robust to controlling for bidder, target, and 
deal characteristics; acquiring companies with below-average ESG performance outperform those 
with above-average ESG performance in the long-term post-acquisition period as well; companies 
with better ESG performance pay CEOs higher percentage of equity-based compensation and the 
relation between CEO duality and companies’ ESG performance is insignificant and neither is the 
relation between CEO duality and M&A performance. Overall, our results show that firms with 
better ESG performance underperform firms with poorer ESG performance during and after M&A 
events. They also show that CEOs who work for high-ESG companies are not driven by 
stewardship. Our results imply that firms with good ESG performance do not make value-
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1. Introduction  
 
CEOs are usually seen as agents for shareholders. According to Ross (1973), agents serve at the 
interest of principals. However, when the interests of the two parties diverge, agents prioritize 
their own interests at the expense of the principals. In order to resolve such conflicts of interests, 
companies deploy mechanisms to better align CEOs’ interests with those of shareholders, so they 
are motivated to serve in the best interest of shareholders.   
An alternative theory suggests that agents do not always act as opportunists. On the contrary, 
they are driven by stewardship and work in the best interest of principals and companies even 
when conflicts of interest occur. Donaldson and Davis (1991) provide an alternative view of CEOs’ 
roles and their decision making incentives that do not jeopardize shareholders' interests. 
Recent literature finds mixed evidence for both agency and stewardship theories. Boyd (1995) 
suggests that both agency theory and stewardship theory can come into play to explain the 
relation between CEOs’ roles and firm performance. Lam and Lee (2008) find that neither agency 
theory nor stewardship theory alone could explain the relation between CEOs’ roles and firm 
performance. Rather, it is contingent on other factors, such as family control, (Lam and Lee 2008), 
board size, (Ramdani and Witteloostuijn 2010) and corporate performance (Elsayed 2007). 
CEOs behavioral patterns as agents or stewards can influence companies’ stimulus mechanism 
and structure. If companies believe CEOs behave more like agents, they are more likely to adopt 
the equity-based compensation that align CEOs interests with those of shareholders, in an 
attempt to achieve better firm performance. Datta, Iskander-Datta and Raman (2001) document 
that managers’ equity-based compensation (EBC) in acquiring companies is positively associated 
with stock price performance around and subsequent to acquisition announcements.  By the same 
token, companies which believe CEOs behave more like agents are more likely to avoid CEO 
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duality structure in order to keep them in check. Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that CEO 
duality put the independence of governance structure in jeopardy and even contributes to the 
conflicts of interest.  It has also been shown to negatively impact mergers and acquisitions deals. 
Desai, Krill and Wright (2003) show that companies with CEO duality do not make profitable 
merger and acquisition deals.  
On the other hand, companies that believe CEOs are driven by stewardship are more likely to 
adopt the opposite measures. Francoeur, Melis, Gaia and Aresu (2017) show that environmentally 
friendly firms give their CEOs less total compensation and also less incentive-based compensation 
than firms that have less concern for the environment because CEOs are less enticed by pecuniary 
rewards but more by environmental protection. This finding is consistent with what is proposed 
by environmental stewardship theory, which is a stakeholder-enlarged view of stewardship.  
Previous literature finds a positive effect of adopting structures and mechanisms conducive under 
a stewardship framework on firms’ performance and mergers and acquisitions. Stewardship 
suggests that CEO should be given more power that facilitates them to work as a steward, who 
always place higher value on shareholders and corporation. For example, CEOs who also hold the 
position of Board Chair can exert greater discretion and have more leeway in directing a firm's 
strategy. Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma (1985), Donaldson and Davis (1991) and Finkelstein and 
D’Aveni (1994) show that CEO duality centralizes leadership, which maximizes shareholders’ 
interest.  
However, there is no existing paper investigating the effect of adopting structures and 
mechanisms under stakeholder-enlarged viewpoint of stewardship on firms’ performance and 
mergers and acquisitions. According to previous literature, CEOs who work for environmentally 
sensitive companies are driven by stewardship. (Francoeur, Melis, Gaia and Aresu 2017). This 
suggests that those CEOs care more about the causes such as environmental sustainability than 
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their personal interests. Environmental stewardship is one of the stakeholder-enlarged views of 
stewardship. A broader stakeholder-enlarged view of stewardship also includes social 
responsibilities and governance practices. Accordingly, we expect CEOs who work in companies 
with better performance in terms of environmental sustainability, social responsibilities, and 
governance practices to behave more as a steward rather than as an agent of shareholders. In 
this paper, we argue that firms with better ESG (environmental, social, governance) performance 
are more likely to pay CEOs lower percentage of equity-based compensation and more likely to 
adopt CEO duality structure which allows CEOs to implement broad based ESG initiatives as 
suggested by previous research. To further explore the effect of structures and mechanisms 
adopted by companies on mergers and acquisitions within the ESG context, we also need to 
consider the impact of ESG factors on firms’ performance. The impact of ESG on M&A 
performance can be either positive or negative. On the one hand, companies with high ESG 
performance are more likely to have CEOs who are driven by stewardship. Those CEOs prioritize 
shareholders interest when it comes to mergers and acquisitions, we expect that companies with 
high ESG performance have better M&A performance. On the other hand, high-ESG acquirers may 
underperform compared to low-ESG acquirers. The assumption is based on the fact that 
companies with better ESG performance may be more likely to acquire targets with similar 
performance in terms of ESG, or need to make investment to improve targets’ ESG performance 
if it is at a lower level than that of acquirers.  
Our sample is comprised of 130 completed US mergers and acquisitions from 2010 to 2016. We 
extract ESG data for the same period. As a proxy for companies’ ESG performance, both overall 
ESG performance and ESG scores from Sustainalytics are used.  
The results are partially consistent with our hypotheses, that high-ESG companies indeed have 
lower return during the announcement period and lower operating performance during post-
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acquisition period. We find that there are some systematic differences among companies with 
different ESG levels. For instance, companies that have above-average ESG performance tend to 
have larger firm size and acquire relatively larger targets. According to previous empirical 
evidence, it is harder for large firms to realize synergies and thus benefit from mergers and 
acquisitions deals. Moreover, acquiring targets with relatively large size makes acquirers 
susceptible to suboptimal performance since it raises the level of barrier for integration. These 
factors likely contribute for high-ESG performers’ poorer performance during the announcement 
period and post-acquisition period. However, the results do not support that high-ESG firms are 
more likely to pay CEOs lower percentage of equity-based compensation nor that high-ESG firms 
are more likely to adopt CEO duality. There is no significant association between firm’s ESG 
performance and CEO duality.  
A comprehensive test of short-term and long-term performances of acquirers shows that firms 
with above-average ESG performance experience significantly more negative returns during the 
announcement period, compared with firms with poorer ESG performance, and it is robust to the 
methodologies that construct ESG variables and controlling for bidder, target and deal 
characteristics. Firms with poorer ESG performance also outperform counterparts with above-
average ESG performance for one-year post-acquisition period in light of industry-adjusted 
operating performance. Besides, it also demonstrates that CEO duality has a positive impact on 
short-term performance, however, the effect is marginal.  
Another test of equity-based compensation illustrates that firms with better ESG performance 
incline to pay CEOs higher percentage of equity-based compensation, and it is robust to 
controlling for firm characteristics. This finding is contrary to previous research which suggests 
lower incentive-based compensation for high ESG firms.  Overall, our evidence is more consistent 
with the agency framework and does not support the predictions of stewardship theory.  
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The rest of the paper is written following the thread: the second part reviews the literature; the 
third part describes the data; the fourth part presents the methodology; the fifth part exhibits the 
empirical results; the sixth part concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Impact of ESG on Merger and Acquisition Deals and Firm Performance 
 
According to Song (2016), both the aggregate ESG information and the ESG pillar information of 
acquirers and targets do not only affect their own market returns but also the combined market 
returns during mergers around the announcement date. He finds that higher aggregate ESG 
scores have a positive impact on companies’ market returns whereas the relation between the 
aggregate ESG scores of targets and their market returns is not significant.  For ESG pillars, targets’ 
governance scores and acquirers’ social scores are priced by the market. According to Bereskin, 
Frederick, et al. (2017), acquiring companies prefer to choose targets which have similar ESG 
performance. The similarities generate higher short-term returns during announcement periods 
and higher long-term returns after mergers and acquisitions. Lu (2014) finds that the market 
reacts more positively to acquiring firms with CSR ratings than the ones without CSR ratings. 
Moreover, the deals between acquiring firms with high CSR ratings and acquired firms with low 
CSR ratings create value in both short run and long run. 
When considering ESG, shareholder value maximization expands to stakeholder value 
maximization during and after mergers and acquisitions. Martirosyan and Vashakmadze (2013) 
document that deploying a framework of stakeholder management system facilitates to identify 
the risk of integration and develop communication and engagement strategies. The finding and 
conclusions are consistent to the previous study, suggesting that less discrepancy results in more 
synergies and smoother integrations.  
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Adopting ESG factors when making cross-border mergers and acquisitions seems to be more 
crucial. Kato (2017) finds that using a sustainable growth strategy that emphasizes on ESG factors 
help to maintain a stable stock price, possess a larger amount of goodwill and produce profit 
growth after mergers and acquisitions.  
Aside from mergers and acquisitions, ESG factors per se can affect stock performance. Nowadays, 
more and more individual and institutional investors make responsible investment, which 
integrates ESG factors into the stock selection and portfolio establishment process. Sherwood and 
Pollard (2018) find that compared with non-ESG integrated emerging market indices, ESG 
integrated emerging market indices perform better, which implies that integrating ESG factors 
into emerging market equities portfolios generates higher return and mitigates downside risk. 
Friede, Busch and Bassen (2015) show that the positive impact of ESG on corporate financial 
performance has been stable over time, and some promising results of ESG investing are also 
obtained from the fields of emerging markets, corporate bonds and green real estate. Waddock 
and Graves (1997) find that corporate social performance is positively associated with prior 
financial performance, suggesting a positive relation between slack resource availability and 
corporate social performance; moreover, corporate social performance is also positively 
associated with future financial performance, suggesting that corporate social performance is an 
indicator of good management, which generates superior financial performance for the future.  
Corporate social performance is different from traditional decision making process and 
investment strategies. Some scholars suggest to use some new metrics to measure the financial 
impacts of corporate social performance strategies, instead of commonly used market measures, 
like share price, and accounting measures, given the facts that they are impacted by factors 
outside corporate social performance strategies. Peloza (2009) brings up suggestions in terms of 
measuring the impacts of corporate social performance investment on financial performance, 
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under the consideration of the mediation process between corporate social performance and 
financial performance. 
Except studies that examine whether socially responsible investing has material effect on 
investment performance, other studies explore the non-financial benefits of responsible 
investing. Richardson (2011) finds that responsible investing allows trustees to invest in the social 
courses to the interest of beneficiaries. They suggest that relying on the will of beneficiaries is a 
means of socially responsible investing.  
             2.2 The Relation between Firms’ ESG Performance and CEO Compensation  
Several papers find an inverse relationship between CEO compensation and firms’ environmental 
performance. The explanations are not the same. Stanwick and Stanwick (2001) and Coombs and 
Gilley (2005) discover the negative relationship between CEO compensation and environmental 
performance. They take a viewpoint of agency theory. They contend that firms behaving better 
in terms of environmental protection tend to discourage CEOs from doing so. As an alternative 
argument to agency theory, Francoeur, Melis, Gaia and Aresu (2017) argue that CEOs do not 
necessarily work as opportunists but rather care about good causes like environmental 
protection. Under stewardship, CEOs are less incentivized by compensation structure designed 
according to agency theory, like equity-based compensation. In other words, they are willing to 
act as stewards for firms and good causes. The paper also explores the impact of institutional 
context on the relationship between CEO compensation and the environmental performances of 
companies. It argues that compared with CEOs who have to comply with mandatory 
environmental regulations, CEOs who voluntarily pursue good environmental performance for 
the firms accept lower total and equity-based compensation.  
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There is also compensation designed to promote companies’ ESG performance, especially for 
firms facing policy risks that intend to address environmental and social issues. Haque (2017) finds 
that ESG-based compensation policy is positively related to carbon reduction initiatives. Velte 
(2016) finds a positive connection between sustainable management board compensation and 
ESG performance. However, not every integration of corporate social performance targets into 
executive compensation can generate ideal results. Maas (2018) finds that the use of corporate 
social performance targets does not always improve corporate social performance results. The 
author also notes that in order to improve corporate social performance, it is more effective to 
use quantitative corporate social performance targets when designing executive compensation. 
Aside from monetary rewards, CEOs intend to pursue socially responsible strategies for other 
considerations. Wright and Ferris (1997) find that under political pressure, CEOs divest from 
certain business units even though the decisions cannot enhance value or raise their personal 
compensation directly. Sometimes such pressure comes from institutional investors. Starks (2009) 
finds that institutional investors’ views on corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility affect CEOs compensation and thus influence managerial decision making and 
strategies. Borghesi, Houston and Naranjo (2014) find that there is positive relation between the 
level of media scrutiny around the firm or its CEO and the level of corporate social responsibility 
investment. It suggests that media attention makes firms prone to make socially responsible 
investment.  
Even from agency theory point of view, adopting ESG and CSR into managerial strategies can 
benefit CEOs as well as shareholders at the same time. After all, CEOs compensation at least 
partially depends on their contribution to the companies and adoption of ESG has been proven to 
improve corporate financial performance. Waddock and Graves (1997) suggest that corporate 
social performance has a positive relation with companies’ financial performance. They argue that 
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it is necessary for CEOs to consider corporate social responsibility when making decisions since it 
can lead to better corporate resource allocation.  
2.3 Impact of CEO Duality on Firms 
There are mixed results related to CEO duality, especially in developed economies. Researchers 
who find the negative association between CEO duality and firms’ performance support agency 
theory, claiming that CEO duality enhances entrenchment and compromise firms’ performance 
whereas researchers who found the positive association between CEO duality and firms’ 
performance endorse stewardship theory, contending that CEO duality facilitates to exert CEOs’ 
talents and improves firms’ performance. Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma (1985), Donaldson and 
Davis (1991) and Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) find that CEO duality can establish strong, 
unambiguous leadership, and maximize shareholders’ interest under stewardship. Peng, Zhang, 
and Li (2007) find that during China’s institutional transitions, CEO duality patterns highly 
supported stewardship theory, which means such mechanism is beneficial to firms’ performance. 
Agency theory holds the opposite viewpoint, reckoning that such structure jeopardizes the 
independence of governance structure and poses a conflict of interest, given that a CEO who is 
responsible for the overall management of the company also takes charge of evaluating the 
effectiveness of the decision making and strategies. (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
When firms have the same individual in those roles, monitoring of CEOs by the board of directors 
has an important effect on firm’s performance. According to agency theory, boards of directors 
serve as a significant monitoring device, which protects shareholder interests (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). Even though boards have significant power on the organizations that they monitor (Dalton, 
Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998; Stiles, 2001), research shows that organizational resources can 
still be used not for the best interest of shareholders (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998; 
Donaldson, 1995). Agency theory also suggests that CEO duality gives rise to CEO entrenchment 
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and impedes boards from effectively monitoring and disciplining (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and 
Johnson, 1998).  
Desai, Krill and Wright (2003) test the direct and indirect performance effects of CEO duality. Most 
importantly, they examine the impact of CEO duality and outside director monitoring on the value 
creation of mergers and acquisitions. They show that companies with CEO duality do not make 
profitable deals. It is aligned with agency theory. Most of papers have found the similar results. 
Haywards and Hambrick (1997) hold that “CEO hubris” explains overpayments for such deals. 
Another study (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990) find that acquisitions made by those firms are 
even no better compared with break-even propositions for acquiring firms. Moreover, managers 
of target firms are more prone to extract premium above the market price (Bradley, Desai and 
Kim, 1988). Agency theory argues that mergers and acquisition made by CEOs who have dual roles 
abuse shareholders’ interest. Amidhud and Lev (1981) document that managers prefer 
exaggerated firm size and diversity even though they are not consistent with profit maximization 
for shareholders.  
Some studies intend to resolve the conflicted results found by previous study. Boyd (1995) suggest 
that those contradictory results can be resolved by considering both agency and stewardship 
viewpoints in terms of duality. The author argues that both agency and stewardship theories can 
come into place when it comes to the relationship between duality and firms’ performance. Lam 
and Lee (2008) find similar results that neither agency theory nor stewardship alone accounts for 
the impact of duality on firms’ performance. Rather, the effect of CEO duality on firms’ 
performance depends on other factors, such as family control. Braun and Sharma (2007) also have 
similar results that separation of dual role is a way to mitigate the family entrenchment risk in 
family-controlled public firms. Ramdani and Witteloostuijn (2010) use a quantile regression 
approach to investigate the relation between CEO duality and firms’ performance and show that 
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the effect of CEO duality on firms’ performance is different across the conditional quantiles of 
firms’ performance distribution and the positive relation between CEO duality and firm 
performance is weakened when increasing the board size.  
The utility of CEO duality is also related to corporate performance itself. Elsayed (2007) finds that 
CEO duality only affects firms’ performance positively given the poor corporate performance.  
3. Data 
To obtain our sample, first we start from sustainability data. After comparing the quality of data 
in different databases for sustainability, we finally chose the data from Sustainalytics, which is a 
database usually used for industrial analysis of equities’ ESG performance. We downloaded ESG 
overall qualitative performance and quantitative performance scores for overall performance as 
well as environmental, social and governance pillars, respectively. To make it comparable, we also 
collected data for each company’s peer performance since for different industries, the standards 
to calculate scores are different. Each industry has its own distribution for each pillar and weights 
allocated to combine scores of each pillar for the total score.  
For overall ESG qualitative performance, given the fact that qualitative performance is relatively 
comparable across different industries, we construct interval variable and also dummy variables 
for each level of overall performance to capture the effect of overall ESG qualitative performance. 
There are five levels of overall ESG qualitative performance, which are Laggard, Underperformer, 
Average Performer, Outperformer, and Leader. For the first method to construct interval variable, 
we chose Laggard as baseline. In other words, companies which have Laggard ESG overall 
performance have zero value for this interval variable. Then we assigned the integer values from 
one to four to underperformer, average performer, outperformer and leader accordingly. 
Even though we can see the effect of overall ESG qualitative performance by regressing our 
dependent variable on the interval variable, it has limitations. It is possible that each level of 
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overall ESG qualitative performance has its own effect and the effects of different levels are 
different. To capture the change in each level, we also construct overall ESG qualitative 
performance dummies. We again use Laggard as baseline and create a dummy variable for each 
of the other levels. For example, if a company has overall ESG qualitative performance equal to 
underperformer, then the variable Underperformer equals 1, otherwise 0. We use the same 
approach to generate values for Average Performer, Outperformer and Leader.  
For quantitative scores, we have the data for both aggregate score and scores for each pillar. 
However, it is not comparable across different industries given the differences existing in 
distributions and weights. To standardize those scores and make them comparable across 
different industries, we scale them by their peer group average scores and regress our dependent 
variable on the ratios. From the univariate analysis, we can see that for both total score ratio and 
for score ratios for each pillar, they increase as the overall qualitative ESG performance level 
increases, which suggests our standardization approach is appropriate. From Laggard to Average 
Performer, the score ratio ranges from 0.7 to 0.9, which means their performance is below peer 
group average. While from Outperformer to Leader, the score ratio ranges from 1.3 to 1.5, which 
means they outperform peer group average. 
Next we extract data from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database for mergers and 
acquisitions. Our timeframe ranges from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2016. All our acquirers 
and targets are public companies in the United States. The deals are completed and deal values 
are more than one million dollars. We excluded utility and financial firms from our sample since 
they are highly regulated.  
Due to the incompatibility of identifiers for the sample from Sustainalytics and the sample from 
SDC, we lost a large number of observations. After merging the samples from these two 
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databases, we ended up having 130 observations that have data for not only sustainability but 
also mergers and acquisitions.  
To construct another two key variables of interest for our study, we obtain data from ExecuComp 
for CEO equity-based compensation and total compensation and data from Bloomberg for CEO 
duality. To standardize CEO compensation data for different companies and industries, similar to 
the approach for ESG data, we scale the amount of equity-based compensation by the total 
amount of compensation, in order to calculate the ratio for equity-based compensation. We 
create a dummy variable as a proxy for CEO duality. If a CEO takes dual roles in the company, the 
variable equals one, otherwise zero. 
In order to rule out the noise from other factors and see impacts of variables of interest on 
mergers and acquisitions, we refer to Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) and control for bidder 
characteristics, target and deal characteristics. The details for variable construction can be found 
in the appendix.  
Based on summary statistics, we can see that outperformer and leader are usually larger than 
companies in the other three lower levels, which partially explains the reason they have lower 
cumulative abnormal returns and long-term operating performance: it is harder for large 
companies to realize synergies because they tend to pay higher premium (Roll (1986)). Previous 
studies have recorded mix results for the effect of Tobin’s q on mergers and acquisitions. Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) document a negative relation between Tobin’s q and acquisition 
performance. Outperformers have higher Tobin’s q compared to companies in the other three 
levels but the difference is insignificant, so we examine the effect of Tobins’ q in the regression 
analysis as well. According to prevailing evidence, companies with higher growth rates tend to 
make riskier investments. Such risky investments potentially have a higher likelihood of negatively 
affecting firm value. We can see that firms with lower ESG ranks have higher leverage ratios, 
14 
 
however, the differences within each level are not significant. Extant research shows firms’ 
leverage has a positive impact on mergers and acquisitions performance because the discipline 
imposed by debt holders motivates management to make value enhancing decision and generate 
free cash flows for firms, otherwise they may have to render the company’s control to creditors. 
Since companies with lower ESG ranks have higher leverage ratios, this can also account for better 
mergers and acquisition performance from companies with lower ESG ranks compared to 
outperformers.  
For target characteristics, we note that underperformers and average performers have larger 
price run up, which suggests that the market prices those targets as more value enhancing with a 
greater likelihood that the acquisitions will create value for the combined entity.  
For CEO compensation, we can see as ESG level increases, the ratio of equity-based compensation 
increases as well. In companies with above peer average performance, the equity-based 
compensation is over 50%, which suggests that companies with higher ESG performance are more 
likely to pay their CEOs with equity-based compensation.  
For deal characteristic, we can see that companies with higher ESG levels incline to make deals 
with relatively large size. Moeller et al. find a negative relation between relative deal size and 
mergers and acquisition performance.  
4. Methodology 
4.1 Event Study Analysis 
To conduct short-term performance analysis for announcement period, we use event study to get 
announcement returns for companies in different ESG levels, and compare announcement 
returns for companies in different ESG levels. As we can see from table 2, ESG underperformers 
have significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns from fifty days prior to the announcement 
date to three days and fifty days after the announcement date. ESG average performers have 
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significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns from fifty days prior to the announcement date 
to three days after the announcement date. On the other hand, outperformers have significantly 
negative cumulative abnormal returns across all event windows except from one day before the 
announcement date to the announcement date. It suggests that ESG outperformers have poorer 
announcement period performance compared with companies in lower ESG ranks, such as 
underperformers and average performers.  
We take the period that ranges from two hundred and sixty days before the announcement date 
to sixty days before the announcement date as the event study estimation period. For event 
period, we take one day before the announcement date and one day after the announcement 
date. We also obtain the cumulative abnormal returns for other event windows, (-50, +50), (-50, 
+3), (-1, 0), (0, +1) and (-2, +2). 
To compute the cumulative abnormal returns, we use market-adjusted model as a benchmark. 
The abnormal return is actual return in excess of CRSP Value-weighted market return. 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 for 
company i over the period of t is computed as: 
 
                                                      𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡)                                                                       (1)   
                                                              
Where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the real return for company i at time t, and 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) is the expected return based on 
the benchmark model. 
4.2 Regression Analysis of Short-Term Performance and Long-Term Performance  
As we see from univariate analysis, better ESG performance has a negative impact on 
announcement returns. To further investigate the relation between ESG performance and short-
term return for mergers and acquisitions, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models, 
adding year dummies and industry dummies as control for year and industry effect. 
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Since the variables that we construct for ESG include both qualitative and quantitative ones, we 
build our models for them separately. For overall ESG qualitative performance, we first include 
ESG interval variable as the only independent variable of interest, called ESG rank (the definition 
for this variable can be found in the appendix), then regress cumulative abnormal returns on it 
and other control variables, which include bidder characteristics, target characteristic, as well as 
deal characteristics. The regression model is written as below: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = α + β1 ESG rank𝑖 + β2 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡 + β3 Target Characteristic𝑖,𝑡 + β4  
Deal Characteristic𝑖,𝑡 + Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect + ε𝑖,𝑡                                         (2) 
 
Where α and β are the coefficients and ε𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
Second, we build a regression model by regressing cumulative abnormal returns on ESG dummies 
that correspond to each overall ESG qualitative performance except the baseline, which is 
Laggard. Control variables added are the same as the previous regression model. The regression 
model is written as below: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = α+ β1 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 + β2 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟 + β3 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟 + β4 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟 
+β5 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡 + β6 Target Characteristic𝑖,𝑡 + β7 Deal Characteristic𝑖,𝑡 + Year 
fixed effect + Industry fixed effect + ε𝑖,𝑡                                                                                               (3) 
                                                                                                        
Where α and β are the coefficients and ε𝑖,𝑡  is the error term. 
Lastly, we create another four regression models for quantitative ESG variables. We include total 
ESG score ratio, environmental score ratio, social score ratio and governance score ratio 
separately into their regression models as the independent variable of interest, and then regress 
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cumulative abnormal returns on them and control variables. Those four regression models are 
listed below: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =α+ β1 Total score ratio𝑖 + β2 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡 + β3 Target Characteristic𝑖,𝑡 
+ β4  Deal Characteristic𝑖,𝑡+ Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect + ε𝑖,𝑡                                      (4)     
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡   =α+ β1 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 +  β2 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡 +  β3 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 
Characteristics𝑖,𝑡 + β4 Deal Characteristic𝑖,𝑡  + Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect + ε𝑖,𝑡        
(5)                                                                                                                                     
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =α+ β1 Social score ratio𝑖 + β2 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡 + β3 Target Characteristic𝑖,𝑡 
+ β4 Deal Characteristic𝑖,𝑡+ Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect + ε𝑖,𝑡                                      (6)     
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡  =α+ β1 Governance score ratio𝑖 + β2 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡+ β3 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡   
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡  + β4 Deal Characteristic𝑖,𝑡+ Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect + ε𝑖,𝑡                                      
(7)     
 
Where α and β are the coefficients and ε𝑖,𝑡  is the error term. 
After analyzing the effect of ESG on short-term performance, we also study the effect of ESG on 
long-term post-acquisition operating performance. The dependent variable is industry-adjusted 
ROA in one year after mergers and acquisitions. ROA is defined as the ratio of EBITDA to total 
assets. EBITDA is earnings before interest expenses, taxes, depreciation and amortization. To 
calculate the one-year post-acquisition industry-adjusted ROA, we first obtain the industry 
average ROAs and subtract industry average ROAs from ROAs for each firm that is in 
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corresponding industries. The regression models for long-term analysis are the same as the ones 
for short-term analysis, except that the dependent variable is ROA instead of CAR. 
4.3 Regression Analysis of CEO Compensation  
As we can see from univariate analysis, companies that have above-average ESG performance 
also pay their CEOs higher percentage of equity-based compensation. On average, the equity-
based compensation accounts for more than 50% of total compensation in those companies. To 
further explore the relation between CEO compensation and ESG performance, we use equity-
based compensation ratio as dependent variable, which equals the amount of equity-based 
compensation divided by total amount of compensation, and ESG performance as independent 
variable of interest to construct regression models. 
Following the same procedure to create variables for ESG factors in regression analysis for 
announcement returns, we first build regression models that only include overall ESG qualitative 
performance. We regress equity-based compensation ratio on ESG rank, which is the main 
variable of interest, and bidder characteristics as control variables. The regression model is as 
below: 
 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 = α + β1 ESG rank𝑖 + β2 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡 + 
Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect + ε𝑖,𝑡                                                                                      (8) 
 
Where α and β are the coefficients and ε𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
Then we include ESG dummies for each level of overall ESG qualitative performance as variables 
of interest and regress the equity-based compensation ratio on these variables as well as bidder 




𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 = α +  β1 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 +  β2 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟 +  β3 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 
Performer +  β4 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟 + β5 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡 + Year fixed effect + Industry 
fixed effect + ε𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                        (9) 
                                                                    
The other regression models are constructed for quantitative ESG variables, we first regress 
equity-based compensation ratio on overall score ratio, which is the main variable of interest and 
control variables, and then add score ratio for each pillar separately as the independent variable 
of interest into regression model and also control variables. These four regression models are as 
below: 
 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡  = α +  β1 Total score ratio𝑖 + β2 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟  
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡  + Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect + ε𝑖,𝑡                                                (10) 
 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡  = α +  β1 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 
 + β2 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡  +Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect + ε𝑖,𝑡                            (11)                                                                                                                   
 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 = α +  β1𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 +  β2 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟 
              𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect + ε𝑖,𝑡                                                (12) 
 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡  = α + β1 Governance score ratio𝑖 +  β2 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect + ε𝑖,𝑡                                                 (13)     
 
Where α and β are the coefficients and ε𝑖,𝑡  is the error term. 
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4.4 Regression Analysis of Short-Term and Long-Term Performance for CEO Duality 
Previous studies have found mixed results for CEO duality. Agency theory suggests that CEO 
duality has negative impact on merger and acquisition deals whereas stewardship theory argues 
that CEO duality affects merger and acquisition deals positively. We want to examine the impact 
of CEO duality on M&A performance in order to see which theory our result is consistent with.  In 
the regression model for short-term analysis, our dependent variable is cumulative abnormal 
returns around the announcements, and our variable of interest is CEO duality; in the regression 
model for long-term analysis, the variable of interest is still CEO duality while our dependent 
variable is one-year post-acquisition operating performance. We control for bidder 
characteristics, target characteristics and deal characteristics for both regression models. 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = α + β1 CEO duality𝑖,𝑡 + β2 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡 + β3 Target Characteristic𝑖,𝑡 + β4  
Deal Characteristic𝑖,𝑡 + Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect + ε𝑖,𝑡                                         (14) 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = α + β1 CEO duality𝑖,𝑡 + β2 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡 + β3 Target Characteristic𝑖,𝑡 + β4  
Deal Characteristic𝑖,𝑡 + Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect + ε𝑖,𝑡                                          (15)   
 
Where α and β are the coefficients and ε𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
4.5 Regression Analysis of Short-Term Performance for ESG and CEO Duality 
The significantly positive relation between ESG factors and equity-based compensation ratio for 
CEOs would be in line with the agency theory. However, better ESG performance actually 
decreases the announcement returns, which means even though the CEOs in companies with 
higher ESG performance are paid with higher percentage of equity-based compensation, they do 
not create values for companies. Through testing, there is no significant relation between CEO 
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duality and CEO equity-based compensation ratio, nor significant relation between CEO duality 
and companies’ ESG performance. We include both CEO duality and ESG factors as variables of 
interest and regress cumulative abnormal returns on them and other control variables, which are 
the same as in the regression analysis for short-term performance for ESG, namely, bidder 
characteristics, target characteristic, and deal characteristics.  
First we construct the regression model that takes CEO duality and ESG rank as the main variables 
of interest, then construct the regression model that includes CEO duality and ESG dummies for 
each level as the main variables of interest. These two regression models that focus on the effect 
of CEO duality and overall qualitative ESG performance are written below: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡= α + β1 CEO duality𝑖,𝑡  + β2 𝐸𝑆𝐺 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + β3 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡 + β4 Target 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + β5  Deal Characteristic𝑖,𝑡 + Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect + ε𝑖,𝑡 
(16) 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡=α+ β1 CEO duality𝑖,𝑡 + β2 𝐸𝑆𝐺 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + β3 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗
𝐸𝑆𝐺 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡+ β4 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡  + β5 Target 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡+ 
β6 Deal Characteristic𝑖,𝑡 + Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect + ε𝑖,𝑡                                                  (17) 
 
              𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = α +  β1CEO duality𝑖,𝑡 +β2 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 + β3 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟 +  β4 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒 
              β5 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟 +β6 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡 + β7Target Characteristic𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                    




Where α and β are the coefficients and ε𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
Then we construct regression models that only include CEO duality and ESG quantitative variables 
as main variables of interest, and then regress cumulative abnormal returns on them and the 
control variables. The regression models for CEO duality and ESG quantitative variables are 
written as below: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡=α+ β1𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡+ β2 Total score ratio𝑖 +β3 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡+ 
β4 Target Characteristic𝑖,𝑡 + β5  Deal Characteristic𝑖,𝑡+ Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect 
+ ε𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                                                 (19)     
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡=α+ β1𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡+ β2 Environment score ratio𝑖 +β3 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡+ 
β4 Target Characteristic𝑖,𝑡 + β5  Deal Characteristic𝑖,𝑡+ Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect 
+ ε𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                                                 (20)                                                                                                                                  
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡=α+ β1𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡+ β2 Social score ratio𝑖 + β3 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡 + 
β4 Target Characteristic𝑖,𝑡 + β5  Deal Characteristic𝑖,𝑡+ Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect 
+ ε𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                                                                                        (21)     
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡=α+ β1𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡+ β2 Governance score ratio𝑖 + β3 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡 + 
β4 Target Characteristic𝑖,𝑡 + β5  Deal Characteristic𝑖,𝑡+ Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect 
+ ε𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                                                (22)     
 




4.6 Regression Analysis of Long-Term Performance for ESG and CEO Duality 
In order to see the effect of ESG factors and CEO Duality in the long run, we also conduct 
regression analysis for long-term post-acquisition operating performance. We include both CEO 
duality and ESG factors as main variables of interest for long-term post-acquisition operating 
performance analysis, along with other control variables. As before, we construct the regression 
models for both qualitative and quantitative ESG variables, they are listed as below: 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡= α + β1 CEO duality𝑖,𝑡 + β2 𝐸𝑆𝐺 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + β3 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡  + β4 Target 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + β5  Deal Characteristic𝑖,𝑡 + Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect + ε𝑖,𝑡 
(23) 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡=α+ β1 CEO duality𝑖,𝑡  + β2 𝐸𝑆𝐺 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + β3 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗
𝐸𝑆𝐺 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡+ β4 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡  + β5 Target 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡+ β6 Deal Characteristic𝑖,𝑡 + Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect + ε𝑖,𝑡                                                  
(24) 
 
              𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = α +  β1CEO duality𝑖,𝑡 +β2 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 + β3 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟 +  β4 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒 
              β5 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟 +β6 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡 + β7Target Characteristic𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                    




𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡=α+ β1𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡+ β2 Total score ratio𝑖 +β3 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡+ 
β4 Target Characteristic𝑖,𝑡 + β5  Deal Characteristic𝑖,𝑡+ Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect 
+ ε𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                                                 (26)     
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡=α+ β1𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡+ β2 Environment score ratio𝑖 +β3 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡+ 
β4 Target Characteristic𝑖,𝑡 + β5  Deal Characteristic𝑖,𝑡+ Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect 
+ ε𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                                                 (27)     
                                                                                                                               
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡=α+ β1𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡+ β2 Social score ratio𝑖 + β3 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡 + 
β4 Target Characteristic𝑖,𝑡 + β5  Deal Characteristic𝑖,𝑡+ Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect 
+ ε𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                                                                                        (28)     
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡=α+ β1𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡+ β2 Governance score ratio𝑖 + β3 Bidder Characteristics𝑖,𝑡 + 
β4 Target Characteristic𝑖,𝑡 + β5  Deal Characteristic𝑖,𝑡+ Year fixed effect + Industry fixed effect 
+ ε𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                                                (29)     
 
Where α and β are the coefficients and ε𝑖,𝑡  is the error term. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Analysis of Short-Term Announcement Returns 
First we analyze the effect of firms’ ESG performance on stock returns around the announcement 
dates of mergers and acquisitions. As we can see from table 4, the stock performances of 
underperformers and average performers are generally better than those of outperformers. The 
cumulative abnormal returns for underperformers 50 days before the announcement date and 
50 days after the announcement date and for 50 days before the announcement date and 3 days 
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after the announcement date are positively significant, at 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. The 
cumulative abnormal returns for average performers 50 days before the announcement date and 
3 days after the announcement date are also positively significant, at 10 % level. While we observe 
totally opposite pattern for outperformers, their cumulative abnormal returns are significantly 
negative for all event windows except 1 day before the announcement date to the announcement 
date, ranging from -5.62% to -1.66%. The univariate results for event study are consistent with 
our hypothesis, which claims that low-ESG performers outperform high-ESG performers during 
the announcement period. 
The results for regression analysis of the announcement returns are in line with those of 
univariate analysis. In table 6, the ESG rank is significantly negative in the first model at 10% level, 
which suggests that as the ESG ranks increase, the cumulative abnormal returns decrease. In the 
second model, we have ESG dummy for each level separately. The coefficient parameter for 
Outperformer is significantly negative at 5% level. For the regression models that include 
quantitative ESG variables, the coefficient parameter for total ESG score ratio is significantly 
negative at 5% level and the coefficient parameters for environmental score ratio and social score 
ratio are both significantly negative at 10% level. In terms of bidder characteristics, Tobin’s q, 
which represent the growth, has significantly positive coefficients at 5% level for all models except 
model VI. For model VI, it is significant at 10% level. As opposed to what has been found in the 
previous studies, this indicates that market reacts positively to the mergers and acquisitions 
decisions made by companies that have high growth or high growth potential, since such deals 
may help them to further develop. The coefficients for leverage are significantly negative for most 
models at 5% level and 10% level, except for model II. This is inconsistent with what is suggested 
by existing literature, which claims that management of companies with more borrowings is 
cautious about the decisions made in order to capture the benefit of financial leverage and avoid 
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possible financial distress that renders the risk of losing controls. However, the regression analysis 
shows that higher leverage ratio decreases cumulative abnormal returns. This suggests that 
companies have higher leverage make suboptimal decisions. For deal characteristics, tender offer 
has significantly negative coefficient parameters in all models except the second one, and three 
out five are significantly negative at 10% level while the other are at 5% level. This shows that 
tender offer is more likely to generate lower returns around announcement. It is consistent with 
what is found in existing literature. Deals involved with stock payment have lower returns because 
it may suggest stocks are overvalued and management uses stocks to pay for the deal in order to 
benefit from such overpricing. The coefficient for relative deal size is significantly negative at 10% 
level for the last model, which is consistent with what is suggested by existing literature and 
univariate analysis, that it is harder to achieve synergies for deals with relatively large size.  
In Table 9, where the regression model has CEO duality as main variable of interest, the coefficient 
of CEO duality is insignificant, which suggests that our result supports neither agency theory nor 
stewardship theory. Therefore, our results are neither consistent with our hypothesis nor align 
with existing literature. 
In Table 10, after adding CEO duality, we can see that not only the signs of ESG factors do not 
change, but also their significance is improved slightly. The coefficient parameter for ESG rank 
becomes significantly negative from 10% level to 5% level. However, in the regression model that 
contains the interaction term of CEO duality and ESG rank, none of the coefficients of the main 
variables of interest are significant and neither the coefficient of the interaction term. The 
coefficient parameter for Outperformer becomes significantly negative from 5% level to 1% level. 
The coefficient parameter for Total score ratio becomes significantly negative from 5% level to 
1% level. The coefficient parameter for Social score ratio becomes significantly negative from 10% 
level to 5% level. However, adding CEO duality does not help to improve the significance of the 
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last model, whose main variable of interest is Governance score ratio. It is insignificant with or 
without CEO duality. Those results are consistent with our hypothesis and what we have found in 
previous analysis. In terms of the impact of CEO duality on cumulative abnormal returns around 
the announcement date, it is significantly positive at 10% level in the first two models, which 
suggests that CEOs who take on dual roles in the company are more likely to make better deals, 
create values for shareholders and such mechanism benefits shareholders and companies, 
aligning with stewardship theory rather than agency theory. However, 10% only shows marginal 
significance, which suggests the pattern of stewardship is not strong. For control variables, the 
signs remain unchanged while the significance is slightly lower. Tobin’s q still has positive effect 
on the cumulative abnormal returns, nevertheless the coefficient for this variable becomes 
significantly positive at 10% level in two models. Leverage ratio still has negative impact on 
cumulative abnormal returns, while the coefficient parameter is significant at 10% level in only 
two models. Tender offer still has negative impact on the cumulative abnormal returns. Without 
adding CEO duality, coefficient is insignificant only in one model, while after adding CEO duality, 
we see the coefficient is significant at 10% level or less in only two models. Deals in which the 
payment involved stocks still have lower returns, while significance level deteriorates. After 
adding CEO duality, some coefficients that are significantly negative at 1% level and 5% level 
become significantly negative at 5% level and 10% level. We see relative deal size becomes 
insignificant in every model. Those findings do not deviate from what we have found before. 
5.2 Analysis of Long-Term Post-Acquisition Performance 
Brammer, Brooks and Pavelin (2006) find similar results as we do for our study, that companies 
with good environmental and social performance have poorer financial performance. To further 
examine the impact of ESG factors on companies’ long-term performance, we analyze the 
univariate and regression results for one-year post-acquisition operating performance, which is 
28 
 
represented by one-year industry-adjusted ROA. First, in table 5, the univariate analysis shows 
that companies whose ESG performance is below average (include average) have significantly 
positive returns, ranging from 2.9% to 5.3%, whereas the long-term post-acquisition operating 
performance for companies whose ESG performance is above average is not significantly different 
from zero, which is consistent with the results for short-term analysis, that companies with poorer 
ESG performance outperform companies with better ESG performance in terms of long-term 
post-acquisition operating performance. This finding is also consistent with our hypothesis and 
previous study. 
Next, in Table 7, we do the regression analysis for long-term post-acquisition operating 
performance without adding CEO duality. Compared with short-term performance analysis, the 
negative magnitude of ESG factors is alleviated. The coefficient for ESG rank is not significant 
anymore. The coefficient for underperformer is significantly positive at 10% level while none of 
the rest ESG dummies are significant, which is consistent with the results for univariate analysis 
that the long-term post-acquisition operating performance of ESG underperformers is better than 
that of higher ranks, and this is also in line with our hypothesis. The coefficient for Total score 
ratio is negatively significant at 10% level, which means that companies with lower Total score 
ratio perform better in the long term, this is consistent with our hypothesis as well. In terms of 
control variables, the significance for control variables is changed to some extent. The coefficient 
for firm size becomes significantly positive for all models, at least at 10% level. It suggests that 
firm size has positive impact on long-term post-acquisition performance, which is consistent with 
the existing empirical evidence, that larger firms are good at realizing economies of scale. The 
coefficient on Tobin’s q is significantly positive in all models, which suggests that growth rate still 
has positive impact on long-term post-acquisition operating performance, and companies with 
higher growth opportunities are more likely to outperform in the long run. Existing literature 
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provides similar evidence. Leverage ratio becomes insignificant in the long-term post-acquisition 
analysis, which suggests that leverage ratio does not impact long-term post-acquisition 
performance significantly. This may suggest probably in the long run, companies can find other 
sources of funds instead of relying on debts. Free cash flow becomes significant in all models, 
which suggests that long-term post-acquisition operating performance is positively associated 
with free cash flow within the firms. This maybe because companies with affluent cash flows have 
the capacity to make better capital investment and thus grow in the long run. It is in line with 
what has been found by existing literature.  The coefficient for price run up becomes significantly 
positive in most regress models at 10% level. This maybe because the market has forecasted the 
good performance after the acquisition and the stock price run up of targets reflects this 
optimism. The finding is opposite to what has been found by existing literature. None of deal 
characteristics is significant for the long-term post-acquisition operating performance. That 
means they only affect the companies’ performance around the announcement period but their 
influence fades away in the long run. 
We also add CEO duality into long-term post-acquisition operating performance analysis, see 
Table 9 and Table 11.   
In Table 9, as the short-term analysis for CEO duality, the coefficient of CEO duality is not 
significant in the model of long-term analysis either. Again, this shows CEO duality does not 
connect to agency theory nor stewardship theory even in the long run analysis, which is not 
consistent with existing literature and our hypothesis. 
In Table 11, after adding CEO duality, the signs and significance for ESG factors and control 
variables remain unchanged, except that the coefficient for Total score ratio becomes significantly 
negative from 10% level to 5% level, the result is consistent with our hypothesis. Nonetheless, the 
coefficient for CEO duality is insignificant in all regression models, which suggests that CEO duality 
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does not have significant impact on long-term post-acquisition operating performance either. Just 
as was the case for short-term analysis, the model that contains interaction term of CEO duality 
and ESG rank does not have significant coefficients for variables of interest, nor is the interaction 
term significant, which is not consistent with our hypothesis. 
5.3 Analysis of CEO Compensation 
CEO compensation is another important factor to be considered when we are studying CEOs’ 
behavioral patterns and their incentives. In Table 6, we find ESG performance actually affects 
merger and acquisition performance negatively.  Previous studies suggests that there is a negative 
relation between CEO compensation and firms’ ESG performance under stewardship. We should 
further see if there is a negative association between ESG and CEO compensation connected to 
stewardship, as suggested by previous studies, or agency. Therefore, we conduct an analysis for 
CEO compensation and firms’ ESG performance. In Table 3 and Table 8, both the univariate 
analysis and regression analysis show that as companies’ ESG performance improves, they pay 
CEOs higher percentage of equity-based compensation, which is opposite to existing literature 
and our hypothesis. In Table 3, we can see that in companies with ESG performance above 
average, the percentage for equity-based CEO compensation is above 50% on average whereas 
for companies with ESG performance below average, the percentage for equity-based CEO 
compensation is below 50% on average. In Table 8, the regression analysis shows that the 
coefficient for ESG rank is significantly positive at 1% level, which means as the ESG level increases, 
the ratio for equity-based compensation increases as well. Regarding ESG dummies, the 
coefficient for underperformer is significantly positive at 10% level while the significance for 
coefficients of both average performer and outperformer increases to 1% level. The coefficients 
for Total score ratio and Environmental score ratio are both significantly positive at 10% level. We 
add bidder characteristics into the regression model to control for variances of compensation 
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ratios due to other factors. Among all the bidder characteristics, only the coefficient for Tobin’s q 
is significantly positive for most regression models at 10% level or less, which means that 
companies with higher growth opportunity are more likely to pay their CEOs with equity-based 
compensation.   
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we conduct an extensive analyses of mergers and acquisitions made by companies 
with different levels of ESG performances. We investigate the effect of ESG factors and CEOs’ 
behaviors on firms’ performance in the announcement period and long-term post-acquisition 
period, using a sample of 130 completed US merger and acquisition deals from 2011 to 2016. 
Our results show the evidence that acquiring firms with above-average ESG performance 
underperform acquiring firms with below-average ESG performance and this finding is robust to 
controlling for bidder, target and deal characteristics. Acquiring companies with below-average 
ESG performance also outperform those with above-average ESG performance in terms of 
industry-adjusted operating performance for one-year post-acquisition period. The results for 
CEOs’ behaviors show they behave like agents: companies with higher ESG performance tend to 
pay their CEOs with higher percentage of equity-based compensation. CEO duality does not have 
a significant influence on M&A performance in the short-run nor in the long-run. 
The results for ESG and companies’ merger and acquisition performance have several 
explanations. First, we find that firms with above-average ESG performance have large size and 
tend to acquire targets that also have large size, which raises the barrier for integration and lowers 
the synergies. Second, companies with higher ESG performance may tend to acquire targets with 
similar ESG performance, limiting the range of targets they can choose.  Third, after acquiring 
companies at lower ESG levels, companies with good ESG performance need to invest into targets, 
aiming at improving targets’ ESG performance, which poses a cost for high-ESG acquirers.  
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The results for ESG and CEOs’ behavioral patterns also have several explanations. First, 
maintaining good ESG performance is becoming more and more important nowadays for 
regulatory and reputational reasons. Nevertheless, it is not necessary for this to be of CEOs’ 
personal interest. On the contrary, they are expected to be compensated for the effort devoted 
to maintaining good ESG performance.  
In conclusion, the evidence robustly aligns with our hypothesis that high-ESG firms underperform 
low-ESG firms in the short-run announcement period and also the long-run post-acquisition 
period and their merger and acquisition deals are not value maximizing. Besides, it shows that 
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0 for Laggard; 1 for Underperformer; 2 for Average 
Performer; 3 for Outperformer; 4 for Leader 
ESG Dummies 
Underperformer: 1 for Underperformer 
and 0 otherwise;     
    
Average Performer: 1 for Average 
Performer and 0 otherwise;    
    
Outperformer: 1 for 
Outperformer and 0 otherwise;     
    
Leader: 1 for Leader and 




Overall Score Ratio: total ESG score divided by peer group total average score     
Environment Score Ratio: environmental score divided by peer group environmental average score 
Social Score Ratio: social score divided by peer group social average score     




Firm Size: logarithm for book value of total assets         
Tobin's Q: market value of total assets over book value of total assets       
Leverage: book value of debts over market value of total assets       
  Free Cash Flow: operating income before depreciation minus interest expense      
  minus income taxes minus capital expenditures, scaled by book value of total assets     
  Price run-up (target): CAR for the period (-50, -10) with CRSP value weighted      
  return using market adjusted model           
Deal 
Characteristics 
Tender Offer: 1 for tender offer, 0 otherwise;           
Stock: 1 for stock payment, 0 otherwise;           
  Diversification: 1 if both acquirer and target are in the same industry, 0 otherwise;     
  Relative Deal Size: transaction value divided by enterprise value of acquirer     
CEO 




                    
Table 1 Sample Distribution by Year 
    This table shows the distribution of the sample by year 
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Number of 












Table 2 Sample Distribution by Industry 
This table shows the distribution of the sample by industry, defined by Fama-French industry classification. Utilities (FF                  
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Table 3 Summary Statistics 
Panel A 
This table displays descriptive statistics on acquiring firm characteristics, target firm characteristics, CEO compensation, ESG score 
ratios, deal characteristics, and CEO Duality for companies with different ESG levels. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
 
                                    Laggard            Underperformer      Average Performer       Outperformer                     Leader                                                                                                                                       
                                       Mean   Median     Mean   Median          Mean   Median           Mean    Median             Mean     Median                                                                                                                                              
Bidder Characteristics    
Firm size                       9.242    9.323         8.754   8.776             9.663    9.640                    10.891   10.875              10.351   10.351 
Tobin’s q                       2.220    1.525          1.795   1.528             1.663    1.516                  2.296     2.224                3.819     3.819 
Leverage                       0.189    0.108        0.159     0.114             0.194    0.165               0.155     0.127                         0.060     0.060 
Free cash flow              0.074   0.042        0.072      0.047                   0.059    0.060                       0.088     0.090                 0.118     0.118 
Target Characteristics  
Price run up                  0.035   0.065        0.078     0.049                  0.052    0.047                       0.043     0.031                -0.102   -0.102 
CEO compensation 
Equity-based                0.323    0.320          0.467     0.480            0.562    0.578               0.620     0.661                 0.696     0.696 
ESG score ratios                             
Total score ratio          0.797    0.790            0.769     0.831            0.975    0.977                      1.279        1.274                 1.347     1.347 
Environment ratio       0.743    0.758           0.764     0.717            0.974    0.968               1.343     1.360                 1.529     1.529 
Social ratio                    0.781    0.793        0.794    0.832            0.955      0.965               1.315     1.358                          1.471     1.471 
Governance ratio         0.875    0.882            0.930    0.896            1.009    1.008               1.127     1.117                          0.967     0.967 
Deal Characteristics 
Relative deal size          0.700    0.710           0.872    0.871                   0.894      0.975               1.089     1.054                 1.009     1.009 
CEO Duality                              3                              7                                   49                                  10                                      2 











This table reports acquiring firm characteristics, target firm characteristics, CEO compensation, ESG score ratios and deal 
characteristics for companies with different ESG levels. *, **, ***represent significant levels at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
The sample is separated by average performer. 
 
                                  below - average    average performer   above - average      difference [below-above] 
 
Bidder Characteristics    
Firm size                                     8.886                                 9.663                               10.823                                 -1.938*** 
Tobin’s q                                    1.910                                 1.663                                2.486                                   -0.577 
Leverage                                    0.167                                 0.194                                0.143                                     0.024 
Free cash flow                          0.073                                 0.059                                0.092                                    -0.019 
Target Characteristics  
Price run up                              0.066                                 0.052                                0.025                                      0.041 
CEO compensation 
Equity-based                            0.428                                  0.562                                0.630                                    -0.202*** 
ESG score ratios                             
Total score ratio                      0.776                                  0.975                                1.297                                    -0.511*** 
Environment ratio                  0.758                                   0.974                                1.366                                    -0.608*** 
Social ratio                               0.791                                   0.955                                  1.334                                    -0.544*** 
Governance ratio                    0.915                                   1.009                                1.107                                    -0.192*** 
Deal Characteristics 
Relative deal size                    0.825                                    0.894                                                1.079                                    -0.254*** 
Observations                   26                                  88                              16 










Table 4 Event Study Announcement Returns 
Panel A 
This table reports the event study CARs around the announcement date for acquiring firms, where the estimation window is 260 
trading days ending 60 days before the announcement date. CARs are calculated based on CRSP value weighted returns. *, **, 
***represent significant levels at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
Event window    laggard      underperformer   average performer   outperformer        leader              All 
 
(-50, +50)               8.02%               6.68%**                              1.14%                      -4.25%**            -1.36%           1.94% 
(-50, +3)                 0.85%               4.25%*                                 2.06%*                    -3.42%*            -0.44%           1.89%** 
(-1, 0)                      3.27%              -0.77%                     -0.24%                     -1.66%             -0.99%          -0.06% 
(-1, +1)                    2.92%               0.55%                     -0.14%                     -5.62%***           5.76%          -0.37% 
(0, +1)                     2.14%              -0.65%                     -0.01%                     -1.89%**           -1.77%          -0.10% 
(-2, +2)                    2.53%              -0.21%                      0.01%                     -3.01%**                  -1.75%          -0.10% 
Observations             7                      19                             88                              14                        2                 130 
             
Panel B 
This table reports the event study CARs around the announcement date for acquiring firms, where the estimation window is 260 
trading days ending 60 days before the announcement date. CARs are calculated based on CRSP value weighted returns. *, **, 
***represent significant levels at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. The sample is separated by average performer. 
 
Event window    below - average    average performer   above - average      difference [below-above] 
 
(-50, +50)                   7.04%**                    1.14%                     -3.89%**                                               10.93%*** 
(-50, +3)                     3.34%                       2.06%*                    -3.05%*                               6.39%** 
(-1, 0)                         0.32%                       -1.66%                    -1.58%*                                                 1.90% 
(-1, +1)                       1.19%                       -0.14%                    -4.20%**                              5.39%**  
(0, +1)                        0.53%                       -0.01%                    -2.85%**                              3.38%**  
(-2, +2)                       0.58%                        0.01%                    -2.85%**                                               3.43%** 
Observations               26                              88                            16 




Table 5 Univariate Analysis of Long-Term Post-Acquisition Operating Performance 
Panel A 
This table presents 1-year post-acquisition average ROAs. *, **, *** show significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
                                                    
                                           Laggard      Underperformer    Average performer    Outperformer    Leader         All                                                                                
 
Industry adjusted ROA         2.90%**          5.28%***                    3.67%***                               6.77%             6.57%         4.32%*** 










This table presents 1-year post-acquisition average ROAs. *, **, *** show significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
                                                    
                                           Below - average    Average Performer   Above - average      Difference [below-above]                                                                    
 
Industry adjusted ROA                  4.64%***                    3.67%***                          6.74%***                        -2.10% 
Observations                                     26                               88                              16  
 
 





Table 6 Regression Analysis of Announcement Returns for ESG  
The table exhibits the regression analysis of acquirer announcement returns. The dependent variable is acquirer’s 3-day CAR-1,+1. 
In model I, the main variable of interest is acquiring firm’s ESG rank. In model II, the main variable of interest is acquiring firm’s 
ESG overall performance dummy. In model III, the main variable of interest is acquiring firm’s ESG total score ratio. In model IV, 
the main variable of interest is acquiring firm’s environmental score ratio. In model V, the main variable of interest is acquiring 
firm’s social score ratio. In model VI, the main variable of interest is acquiring firm’s governance score ratio.   
 
                                      I                          II                        III                         IV                          V                          VI 
 
ESG rank                 0.081*                                                     
                                 (-1.76) 
Underperformer                                0.731 
                                                              (-0.34) 
Average performer                            0.515 
                                                              (-0.65) 
Outperformer                                     0.021** 
                                                              (-2.33) 
Leader                                                  0.686 
                                                              (-0.41) 
Total score ratio                                                         0.013** 
                                                                                      (-2.53) 
Environment score ratio                                                                      0.079* 
                                                                                                                 (-1.77) 
Social score ratio                                                                                                               0.058* 
                                                                                                                                             (-1.92) 
Governance score ratio                                                                                                                                   0.703 
                                                                                                                                                                             (-0.38) 
Bidder characteristics 
Log (total assets)   0.659                   0.848                0.870                0.945                 0.737                      0.299 
                                 (-0.44)                  (0.19)               (0.16)               (0.07)                 (-0.34)                    (-1.04) 
Tobin’s q                 0.043**                          0.033**             0.021**             0.013**              0.034**                    0.057* 
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                                 (2.05)                   (2.16)                 (2.34)                (2.52)                    (2.15)                  (1.92) 
Leverage                 0.091*                  0.115                  0.051*               0.097*                   0.048**               0.086* 
                                 (-1.71)                 (-1.59)                 (-1.93)               (-1.67)                  (-2.00)                (-1.72) 
Free cash flow        0.812                  0.987                   0.879                 0.887                   0.860                   0.888 
                                  (-0.24)                (0.02)                  (-0.15)               (0.14)                   (-0.18)                 (-0.14) 
Target characteristics 
Price run up             0.780                  0.751                  0.892                  0.833                   0.991                 0.677 
                                   (0.28)                 (0.32)                  (0.16)                 (0.21)                   (-0.01)               (0.42) 
Deal characteristics 
Tender offer            0.057*                 0.167                  0.046*                  0.026**               0.077*               0.036** 
                                   (-1.93)                (-1.39)                 (-2.02)                 (-2.26)               (-1.78)               (-2.13) 
Stock                         0.012*                           0.011**               0.005***               0.010***                      0.013**             0.032** 
                                   (-2.55)                (-2.60)                (-2.86)                  (-2.61)               (-2.52)               (-2.17) 
Diversification         0.598                  0.840                  0.798                    0.690                  0.629                0.604 
                                   (0.53)                 (0.20)                  (0.26)                   (0.40)                  (0.48)               (0.52) 
Relative deal size    0.200                  0.267                   0.103                    0.109                  0.135                0.100* 
                                   (-1.29)                (-1.12)                 (-1.64)                  (-1.62)                (-1.50)              (-1.66) 
 
Year fixed                   Yes                     Yes                       Yes                         Yes                     Yes                    Yes 
Industry fixed            Yes                      Yes                      Yes                         Yes                     Yes                    Yes 
Adjusted R2                       0.107                 0.125                   0.130                     0.107                  0.111               0.084 





Table 7 Regression Analysis of Long-Term Post-Acquisition Operating Performance for ESG 
The table exhibits the regression analysis of post-acquisition operating performance. The dependent variable is acquirer’s 1-year 
industry adjusted ROA. In model I, the main variable of interest is acquiring firm’s ESG rank. In model II, the main variable of 
interest is acquiring firm’s ESG overall performance dummy. In model III, the main variable of interest is acquiring firm’s ESG total 
score ratio. In model IV, the main variable of interest is acquiring firm’s environmental score ratio. In model V, the main variable 
of interest is acquiring firm’s social score ratio. In model VI, the main variable of interest is acquiring firm’s governance score 
ratio.   
 
                                      I                          II                       III                          IV                           V                           VI 
 
ESG rank                 0.514                                                    
                                 (-0.65) 
Underperformer                                0.059* 
                                                              (1.91) 
Average performer                            0.462 
                                                              (0.74) 
Outperformer                                     0.512 
                                                              (0.66) 
Leader                                                  0.747 
                                                              (-0.32) 
Total score ratio                                                          0.059* 
                                                                                       (-1.91) 
Environment score ratio                                                                       0.919 
                                                                                                                  (-0.10) 
Social score ratio                                                                                                               0.176 
                                                                                                                                             (-1.36) 
Governance score ratio                                                                                                                                  0.924 
                                                                                                                                                                            (-0.10) 
Bidder characteristics 
Log (total assets)   0.022**                0.014**              0.004***             0.062*               0.010***               0.029** 
                                 (2.32)                  (2.49)                (2.90)                 (1.89)                 (2.60)                   (2.20) 
Tobin’s q                 0.012**                        0.007***             0.006***             0.025**               0.008***              0.012** 
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                                 (2.56)                   (2.77)                (2.90)                (2.27)                 (2.68)                   (2.50) 
Leverage                 0.515                   0.631                 0.416                 0.503                 0.400                    0.505 
                                  (-0.65)                (-0.48)                (-0.82)               (-0.67)               (-0.85)                  (-0.67) 
Free cash flow        0.000***              0.000***             0.000***             0.000***             0.000***              0.000*** 
                                  (4.69)                  (4.66)                 (4.80)                (4.64)                 (4.75)                   (4.68) 
Target characteristics 
Price run up             0.069*                0.105                  0.094*                0.064*                0.122                   0.061* 
                                   (1.84)                 (1.63)                 (1.69)                 (1.87)                 (1.56)                   (1.89) 
Deal characteristics 
Tender offer            0.339                   0.465                  0.300                0.387                 0.259                   0.382 
                                   (0.96)                 (0.73)                  (1.04)                (0.87)                 (1.13)                  (0.88) 
Stock                         0.263                             0.195                  0.141                 0.309                          0.229                   0.320 
                                   (-1.13)                 (-1.30)                (-1.48)               (-1.02)               (-1.21)                 (-1.00) 
Diversification         0.273                  0.229                   0.364                 0.282                 0.281                  0.277 
                                   (1.10)                  (1.21)                  (0.91)                 (1.08)                (1.08)                  (1.09) 
Relative deal size    0.350                   0.460                  0.381                 0.412                 0.346                  0.414 
                                   (0.94)                  (0.74)                  (0.88)                 (0.82)                (0.95)                  (0.82) 
 
Year fixed                 Yes                      Yes                       Yes                      Yes                     Yes                     Yes 
Industry fixed          Yes                      Yes                       Yes                      Yes                     Yes                     Yes 
Adjusted R2                    0.328                  0.343                   0.346                  0.326                0.336                  0.326 





                                                  Table 8 Regression Analysis for CEO Compensation 
The table exhibits the regression analysis of acquirer CEO equity-based compensation ratio. The dependent variable is acquirer’s 
equity-based compensation ratio. In model I, the main variable of interest is acquiring firm’s ESG rank. In model II, the main 
variable of interest is acquiring firm’s ESG overall performance dummy. In model III, the main variable of interest is acquiring 
firm’s ESG total score ratio. In model IV, the main variable of interest is acquiring firm’s environmental score ratio. In model V, 
the main variable of interest is acquiring firm’s social score ratio. In model VI, the main variable of interest is acquiring firm’s 
governance score ratio.   
 
                                      I                          II                        III                         IV                          V                          VI 
 
ESG rank                 0.001***                                                     
                                 (3.41) 
Underperformer                                0.064* 
                                                              (1.87) 
Average performer                            0.001*** 
                                                              (3.39) 
Outperformer                                     0.003*** 
                                                              (3.01) 
Leader                                                  0.089* 
                                                              (1.71) 
Total score ratio                                                          0.090* 
                                                                                       (1.71) 
Environment score ratio                                                                      0.053* 
                                                                                                                 (1.96) 
Social score ratio                                                                                                               0.347 
                                                                                                                                             (0.94) 
Governance score ratio                                                                                                                                    0.338 
                                                                                                                                                                              (0.96) 
Bidder characteristics 
Log (total assets)   0.982                   0.673                0.727                0.962                 0.408                       0.281 
                                 (-0.02)                  (0.42)               (0.35)                (-0.05)               (2.05)                      (1.08) 
Tobin’s q                 0.079*                            0.027**             0.064*               0.290                 0.043**                    0.034** 
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                                 (1.77)                   (2.24)                 (1.87)                 (1.07)                  (2.05)                 (2.14) 
Leverage                 0.117                   0.135                  0.203                 0.127                   0.204                 0.138 
                                 (-1.58)                 (-1.51)                 (-1.28)               (-1.54)                 (-1.28)                (-1.49) 
Free cash flow        0.368                  0.491                   0.461                 0.285                   0.496                  0.487 
                                  (-0.90)                (-0.69)                  (-0.74)               (-1.07)                (-0.68)                (-0.70) 
 
Year fixed                Yes                      Yes                        Yes                      Yes                       Yes                    Yes 
Industry fixed         Yes                      Yes                        Yes                      Yes                       Yes                    Yes 
Adjusted R2                  0.127                  0.127                    0.067                  0.074                   0.111                0.052 





Table 9 Announcement Returns and Long-Term Operating Performance Regression Analysis for CEO 
Duality 
The table exhibits the regression analysis of acquirer announcement returns and one-year post-acquisition operating 
performance for CEO duality. In model I, the dependent variable is acquirer’s 3-day CAR-1,+1. In model II, the dependent variable 
is acquirer’s one-year post-acquisition operating performance. In both models, the main independent variable of interest is 
acquiring firm’s CEO duality.  
 
                                                                I                                                                        II 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Duality                                         0.295                                                                                                   0.892                   
                                                      (1.05)                                                               (0.14)              
Bidder characteristics 
Log (total assets)                       0.103                                                                0.035**             
                                                      (-1.64)                                                              (2.14)            
Tobin’s q                                     0.628                                                                                                     0.012**           
                                                     (0.49)                                                                (2.54)             
Leverage                                     0.389                                                                0.536              
                                                     (-0.87)                                                               (-0.62)            
Free cash flow                           0.611                                                                 0.000***              
                                                     (0.51)                                                                (4.62)             
Target characteristics 
Price run up                               0.579                                                                 0.055*              
                                                     (0.56)                                                                (1.94)             
Deal characteristics 
Tender offer                               0.085                                                                0.370              
                                                     (-1.74)                                                               (0.90)             
Stock                                           0.022**                                                                                                  0.306            
                                                     (-2.32)                                                               (-1.03)             
Diversification                           0.668                                                                 0.258               
                                                     (0.43)                                                                (1.14)               
Relative deal size                      0.138                                                                 0.370               
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                                                     (-1.49)                                                               (0.90)             
 
Year fixed                                      Yes                                                                   Yes                   
Industry fixed                               Yes                                                                   Yes                   
Adjusted R2                                                       0.044                                                               0.333            
Observations                                130                                                                   130                  
 
 




Table 10 Announcement Returns Regression Analysis for CEO Duality and ESG 
The table exhibits the regression analysis of acquirer announcement returns. The dependent variable is acquirer’s 3-day CAR-1,+1. 
In model I, the main variable of interest is acquiring firm’s CEO duality and ESG rank. In model II, the main variable of interest is 
acquiring firm’s CEO duality and ESG overall performance dummy. In model III, the main variable of interest is acquiring firm’s 
CEO duality and ESG total score ratio. In model IV, the main variable of interest is acquiring firm’s CEO duality and environmental 
score ratio. In model V, the main variable of interest is acquiring firm’s CEO duality and social score ratio. In model VI, the main 
variable of interest is acquiring firm’s CEO duality and governance score ratio.  
 
                                    I                       II                     III                    IV                     V                      VI                   VII 
 
Duality                     0.091*                 0.078*                  0.101               0.232             0.130                0.275            0.463  
                                 (1.70)            (1.78)             (1.63)               (1.20)             (1.52)               (1.10)            (0.74) 
ESG rank                 0.025**                                                                                                                                            0.300 
                                 (-2.27)                                                                                                                                   (-1.04) 
Duality*ESG rank                                                                                                                                                 0.785 
                                                                                                                                                                                (-0.27) 
Underperformer                          0.688 
                                                        (-0.40) 
Average performer                      0.386 
                                                        (-0.87) 
Outperformer                               0.005*** 
                                                        (-2.88) 
Leader                                            0.581 
                                                        (-0.55) 
Total score ratio                                                  0.005*** 
                                                                               (-2.85) 
Environment score ratio                                                                0.061* 
                                                                                                           (-1.89) 
Social score ratio                                                                                                      0.027** 
                                                                                                                                    (-2.23) 
Governance score ratio                                                                                                                  0.582 




Log (total assets)   0.461             0.900            0.994               0.926               0.599                0.209             0.359 
                                 (-0.74)           (-0.01)           (0.01)               (-0.09)             (-0.53)              (-1.26)         (-0.92) 
Tobin’s q                 0.060*                  0.032**          0.016**            0.011**            0.027**             0.051*                0.585 
                                 (1.94)             (2.16)            (2.45)               (2.60)              (2.24)               (1.97)            (0.55) 
Leverage                 0.187             0.222             0.078*              0.137               0.067*             0.125             0.407 
                                  (-1.33)           (-1.23)           (-1.78)             (-1.50)             (-1.85)             (-1.55)          (-0.83) 
Free cash flow        0.906             0.666             0.792               0.654              0.831               0.879            0.539 
                                  (0.12)             (0.43)            (0.26)               (0.45)             (0.21)               (0.15)            (0.62) 
Target characteristics 
Price run up             0.768             0.710             0.842               0.783              0.997                0.624           0.648 
                                   (0.30)             (1.78)            (0.20)               (0.28)             (0.00)               (0.49)           (0.46) 
Deal characteristics 
Tender offer            0.109              0.296             0.101                0.047**          0.167               0.065*                 0.156 
                                   (-1.62)           (-1.05)            (-1.65)               (-2.01)          (-1.39)             (-1.87)         (-1.43) 
Stock                         0.05**                     0.020**           0.010*               0.018**              0.026**            0.061*            0.012** 
                                   (-1.95)            (-2.36)            (-2.64)              (-2.39)          (-2.26)            (-1.89)          (-2.54) 
Diversification         0.485              0.848              0.839                0.699            0.640             0.599            0.635 
                                   (0.70)             (0.19)              (0.20)               (0.39)           (0.47)             (0.53)             (0.48) 
Relative deal size    0.200              0.298              0.107                0.113            0.148             0.103             0.270 
                                   (-1.29)            (-1.05)            (-1.62)               (-1.60)         (-1.46)            (-1.64)          (-1.11) 
 
Year fixed               Yes                     Yes                   Yes                      Yes                 Yes                Yes               Yes 
Industry fixed        Yes                     Yes                   Yes                      Yes                 Yes                Yes               Yes 
Adjusted R2                 0.103                 0.136               0.145                 0.113             0.123            0.087           0.141 






Table 11 Long-Term Post-Acquisition Operating Performance Regression Analysis for CEO Duality and 
ESG 
The table exhibits the regression analysis of post-acquisition operating performance. The dependent variable is acquirer’s 1-year 
industry adjusted ROA. In model I, the main variable of interest is acquiring firm’s CEO duality and ESG rank. In model II, the main 
variable of interest is acquiring firm’s CEO duality and ESG overall performance dummy. In model III, the main variable of interest 
is acquiring firm’s CEO duality and ESG total score ratio. In model IV, the main variable of interest is acquiring firm’s CEO duality 
and environmental score ratio. In model V, the main variable of interest is acquiring firm’s CEO duality and social score ratio. In 
model VI, the main variable of interest is acquiring firm’s CEO duality and governance score ratio.   
 
                                 I                    II                        III                    IV                      V                      VI                 VII 
 
Duality                     0.809             0.748                      0.585             0.885               0.649                0.879          0.674 
                                 (0.24)        (0.32)                (0.55)             (0.14)              (0.46)                (0.15)         (-0.42) 
ESG rank                 0.482                                                                                                                                          0.299 
                                 (-0.71)                                                                                                                                (1.06) 
Duality*ESG rank                                                                                                                                              0.238 
                                                                                                                                                                             (-1.20) 
Underperformer                       0.059* 
                                                     (1.91) 
Average performer                   0.486 
                                                     (0.70) 
Outperformer                            0.544 
                                                     (0.61) 
Leader                                         0.715 
                                                     (-0.37) 
Total score ratio                                                    0.049** 
                                                                                 (-1.99) 
Environment score ratio                                                             0.906 
                                                                                                        (-0.12) 
Social score ratio                                                                                                   0.155 
                                                                                                                                 (-1.43) 
Governance score ratio                                                                                                               0.896 
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                                                                                                                                                        (-0.13) 
Bidder characteristics 
Log (total assets)   0.027*            0.017**          0.006***          0.071*          0.013**          0.037**         0.891 
                                 (2.24)             (2.42)             (2.83)              (1.82)           (2.52)            (2.11)           (-0.14) 
Tobin’s q                 0.011**                0.006***         0.005***           0.023**        0.008***        0.013*                0.250 
                                 (2.59)             (2.79)             (2.88)              (2.30)           (2.72)            (2.53)           (-1.17) 
Leverage                 0.564             0.691              0.479              0.544           0.450             0.548            0.894 
                                  (-0.58)          (-0.40)             (-0.71)            (-0.61)          (-0.76)          (-0.60)          (0.13) 
Free cash flow        0.000***        0.000***          0.000***          0.000***       0.000***        0.000***       0.107 
                                  (4.62)            (4.60)             (4.80)              (4.53)           (4.72)            (4.57)           (1.66) 
Target characteristics 
Price run up             0.063**         0.097*            0.085*             0.060*          0.115            0.056*          0.641 
                                   (1.87)           (1.67)             (1.74)              (1.90)           (1.59)            (1.93)          (-0.47) 
Deal characteristics 
Tender offer            0.317            0.428             0.254               0.373           0.224            0.367           0.276 
                                   (1.01)           (0.80)             (1.15)              (0.89)           (1.22)            (0.90)          (1.11) 
Stock                         0.267                   0.204             0.155               0.306                 0.250            0.327           0.697 
                                   (-1.12)          (-1.28)           (-1.43)             (-1.03)          (-1.16)          (-0.98)         (0.39) 
Diversification         0.257            0.216             0.354               0.264           0.267            0.258           0.099* 
                                   (1.14)           (1.24)             (0.93)              (1.12)           (1.12)            (1.14)          (1.71) 
Relative deal size    0.308            0.413              0.337              0.370           0.302            0.371           0.034** 
                                   (1.02)           (0.82)              (0.96)             (0.90)           (1.04)            (0.90)          (2.22) 
 
Year fixed                  Yes                 Yes                  Yes                  Yes                Yes                Yes             Yes 
Industry fixed           Yes                 Yes                  Yes                  Yes                Yes                Yes             Yes 
Adjusted R2                     0.331             0.346               0.349              0.328           0.339            0.328         0.405 
Observations            130                 130                  130                 130               130               130            130 
 
 
